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Leasing and Loaning but Losing Track of the Difference 
ROGER BERNHARDT 
Vallely Investments, L.P. v BancAmerica Commercial Corp. (2001) 88 CA4th 816, 106 CR2d 
689, reported in this issue at p 201, demonstrates that knowing a lot about mortgage law won’t 
make up for forgetting some elementary principles of landlord-tenant law. As a leasehold 
mortgagee intending to foreclose, the bank obviously put a good deal of thought into how best to 
work out matters with its trustor-borrower as far as the mortgage was concerned. But it failed to 
appreciate that its debtor was a tenant on a lease as well as a trustor on its deed of trust, and that 
the lease had seniority over the mortgage.  
The terms of the lease reflected thoughtful bargaining by the parties. The tenant (Balboa) 
apparently intended to borrow money later on the security of its leasehold and wanted to do so 
on terms as favorable as possible. The landlord (Vallely) apparently was willing to cooperate by 
permitting any leasehold mortgagee to foreclose withou  having to assume any liability under the 
lease, as long as all other assignees did assume. Balboa probably anticipated that transferees 
planning to operate under the lease would not object to assuming the leasehold obligations, but 
also knew that a mortgage lender is averse to any downside feature in a loan and would not want 
to carry a liability (such as the obligation to pay rent) on its books after foreclosing. This 
arrangement made good sense for both of them.  
The planning would have paid off if the bank, as leasehold mortgagee, had not mishandled 
Balboa’s default by having Balboa assign the lease to a bank-related auxiliary (BACC), which 
both accepted the assignment a d assumed the lease obligation. The facts show that Balboa was 
sinking and willing to cooperate, but that the existence of junior liens made a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure unattractive. (Mechanics’ lienors are probably hard to negotiate with.) 
Considerations like that justify a decision to foreclose the mortgage, but they do not also argue 
for having the leasehold assigned in the meanwhile. Junior lienors are eliminated as effectively 
and speedily by a foreclosure on the original tenant as by one on the assignee.  
I assume the bank required the assignment because it wanted to control the property during the 
foreclosure proceedings. A receivership, however, would have accomplished that as well as an 
assignment, especially if the appointment was not going to be contested. As of 1996, a mere 
demand on the operating tenants for rents under CC §2938 would have sufficed, but even before 
1996, standard clauses in all deeds of trust permitted he beneficiary to demand rents or 
possession on default, and a borrower willing to assign the lease for the lender’s sake seems 
equally likely to be willing to honor a demand for rent. In fact, since 1872, CC §2927 has 
explicitly permitted such an arrangement: “A mortgage does not entitle the mortgagee to the 
possession of the property, unless authorized by the express terms of the mortgage; but after the 
execution of the mortgage the mortgagor may agree to such change of possession without a new 
consideration.” (Emphasis added.) Perhaps the bank wanted to avoid the status of being a 
“mortgagee in possession,” although it is hard to kn w what it found wrong with that, given its 
willingness to accept an assignment arrangement. These possible alternatives—demanding the 
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rents under the deed of trust, taking possession, or having a receiver appointed—certainly seem 
to make a lease assignment unnecessary.  
The drawback of an assignment in this case was that the lease required it to be combined with 
an assumption. (If the bank intended to violate the lease terms in its workout arrangements, it 
would have been much better off to not assume than o assume and record but not tell the 
landlord, which makes me think that the failure to inform was a simple oversight.) Once there 
was an assumption, all of the advantage derived from the original leasehold mortgage provision 
was lost. A foreclosure would eliminate the mortgage on the leasehold, but it would not 
eliminate the leasehold itself or its attendant renliability, which now burdened the assuming as-
signee as much as it had burdened the original tenan . As foreclosure purchaser, the bank was a 
lease assignee, but not an assuming one, because the original lease limited the bank’s lease 
liability to privity of estate—i.e., only so long as it remained a tenant. But the liability of its 
predecessor tenant (BACC) was not similarly limited. Thus, Vallely, the landlord, could go after 
BACC even though it could not go after the bank, when the ultimate tenant, Edgewater, failed to 
pay the rent.  
A sublease may or may not have made a difference. I the court’s paraphrase of the lease, the 
critical clause refers to “assignment” but not “sublease.” While that may merely be shorthand, 
BACC’s argument that this was a sublease rather than an assignment does suggest that it thought 
the distinction would make a difference. Perhaps the lease did limit the assumption requirement 
to assignments and not to subleases (although that seems unlikely), but if subtenants also had to 
assume, a sublease to an assuming BACC would have left it in the same situation. Subletting or 
assigning can make a difference, but not when both involve assuming. 
“The mistake happened because the bank’s lawyers were probably thinking more about 
foreclosure law than landlord-tenant law.” 
The mistake happened because the bank’s lawyers were probably thinking more about 
foreclosure law than landlord-tenant law. In any event, the liability of an assuming assignee who 
is not in possession of the leased premises is somewhat counterintuitive. We so regularly tend to 
equate rent and possession that we often forget that a person can be liable for rent even when he 
is no longer entitled to possession. The original tenant who assigns her lease remains bound on 
her promise to pay rent for the entire term even after she is no longer the tenant; and the same is 
true for the assignee who assumes those terms as part of ccepting the assignment of the 
leasehold. Ironically, landlords should insist that assignees assume, not to hold them liable on the 
lease covenants—they generally run with the land anyw y, binding even nonassuming 
assignees—but to be able to hold those assignees liable if the second assignees default. This is 
not the case when the first assignee is obligated only by privity of estate rather than privity of 
contract; in that event, a second assignment by a prior nonassuming assignee terminates all 
future lease liability for him.  
In this case there was a second assignee, Edgewater. We are not told whether it also assumed 
the lease (although it should have, since the lease provision exempting the leasehold mortgagee 
did not seem to extend to the next post-foreclosure assignee). But because Edgewater then went 
into bankruptcy, it did not much matter whether it had assumed the lease or not: Neither the 
landlord nor the bank (as assignor, not as mortgagee) could get much from it. Nor did the 
assignee, BACC, have any recourse against Balboa as ssignor, which had made the same 
promise to pay the rent as BACC. Vallely could have gone after Balboa for rent if it was unable 
to recover from BACC, but, between Balboa and BACC, ultimate rent liability should fall on 
BACC as the maker of the assumption promise rather t an on Balboa as the receiver of the 
promise. In any event, Balboa also went bankrupt, leaving BACC as the only solvent and liable 
party.  
This lease still has 50 years to run. Edgewater rejct d it in bankruptcy, but the lease itself is 
not dead as far as Vallely and BACC are concerned. Since BACC continues to owe rent, the 
leasehold still exists; otherwise, the liability would be for damages rather than rent. The lease 
gives BACC the right to assign—and it better do so if it wants to minimize its liability. Of 
course, the lease also requires that the next assignee assume, but at least the parties’ eyes should 
be wide open when they go through this again.  
 
